derstanding of how China's communist regime has been able to maintain broadly based support as it liberalizes the economy. Deeply entrenched cultural attitudes and practices predispose the new business elite to cooperate with the regime in a clientelistic pattern, a predisposition that is reinforced by socialist corporatism. It will take far more than the disappearance of communism or the creation of a multiparty system to eliminate this mutually beneficial hybrid pattern. Price is aware of the difficulties encountered in assigning numerical scores to societies' performance on these dimensions, which in the final analysis are based on "guesstimates." Turkey gets a one on authenticity, and Senegal gets a "three or four" (p. 146). The decision as to what score to accord a society comes down to interpreting the evidence contained in leaders' statements and speeches; scholarship on the political systems involved; constitutions; media reports; information generated from these states' embassies in the United States; the author's personal contacts in these states; and survey questionnaire responses by members of the Middle East Studies Association of North America. Price then seeks to Book Reviews: COMPARATIVE POLITICS June 2000 collate and distill the data generated by all these sources into quantitative integers, which is a daunting task at the least.
Four descriptive chapters discuss Egypt and Jordan, Syria and Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and Algeria and Iran. Another fifteen Muslim states are included in the statistical analysis. The relationship between Islam and democracy is mediated by seven variables, four of which, because difficult to quantify, are excluded from the regression analysis. These four are historical influences, regime strength, regime strategy, and the strength and orientation of Islamic groups. The remaining three are quantifiable: modernization, presence of social cleavages in society, and the presence of a minority religious group. Among Price's hypotheses are: (1) an inverse correlation exists between the presence of politicized cleavages and democracy; (2) there is an inverse correlation between the existence of a minority religious group and democracy; (3) a curvilinear relationship exists between the degree of a society's "wealthiness" and democracy (beyond a certain threshold of wealth, the relationship becomes inverse); (4) the more rapid the economic change occurring in a society, the less democratic it will be; and (5) a positive relationship exists between the level of social mobility in a society and democracy.
After his statistical runs, Price concludes: "I have provided evidence in support of the argument that Islam is not a monolithic political force that is the primary cause of political outcomes in predominantly Muslim countries" (p. 177). When control variables are placed into the mix, the relationship between Islamic political culture and authoritarianism becomes insignificant.
To all this one can only say "amen." Should we be surprised? After all, a moment's reflection will reveal diversity in the social, economic, and political processes and institutions of contemporary Muslim states. Because of these variations, one may not logically use the constant of "Islam" to explain authoritarianism in these systems. If "Islam" were the culprit, then the polities of these systems would be characterized by uniformity. Price is to be commended for the industry he brought to the task of making sense of Islamic political culture, but such labors appear to have yielded a finding that is predictable on theoretical grounds.
The book contains a number of errors in grammar, syntax, orthography, and occasionally even substance. An example of this last is the statement that Islamic law "was finalized over eight hundred years ago and has not been significantly altered since" (p. 24). In fact, the shari'ah continues to evolve, in part because one of its sources is the opinion of jurists. In earlier periods, the juristic principle of maslahah mursalah (public interest) was scarcely known, but in the last two centuries it has been elaborated in a way as to be For Purnell, the contours of state power emerged from myriad local and regional histories of negotiation, accommodation, and resistance. In this respect, Purnell clearly locates her work within the recent literature in Mexican studies on everyday forms of state formation (the title of a 1994 volume edited by Gil Joseph and Daniel Nugent, which include essays by James Scott and Derek Sayer). In this sense, Purnell takes aim against both orthodox and revisionist understandings of revolutionary state formation in Mexico. The former tend to view the state as representing the popular will, and the latter claim that the new state was able simply to impose its centralized authority on a passive society. For Purnell, state power is not seen in terms of the successful centralization of authority in the capital city (expressed by the notion of "Leviathan on the Zocalo"). Instead, it is the contingent result of conflictive processes of resistance and negotiation that take place in a great variety of local and regional contexts, where what is at stake is not national power but local understandings of political authority, religious practices, and property relations.
The book is divided into eight chapters. The first lays out Purnell's argument in favor of the nuances of local histories, promising a very descriptive but also analytically perceptive text. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide relevant historical contextualization of local resistance to nineteenth-century liberalism and (early) twentieth-century state formation. In this way, Purnell connects longer term processes of identity formation with the cristero rebellion. Her original, empirical research, carried out as part of a doctoral dissertation, is
